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This  paper  formalizes  ideas  from  classical  and  radical  political  economy  on  task  allocation  and
technology adoption under capitalism. A few previous studies have attempted this, but the framework
and  results  in  this  paper  are  different.  I  model  labor  contracts  that  are  incomplete  owing  to
unforeseen/indescribable  contingencies,  leading  to  Pareto-improving  renegotiation  and  a  hold-up
problem. Given path dependence, the allocation is sub-optimal, with the extent of inefficiency depending
upon  the  degree  of  incompleteness.  This  model  captures  insights  from  the  above  literature  on  the
microeconomic roots of inefficiency and power. It also provides a concrete setting where indescribable
contingencies do (or don’t) matter - a much-debated issue.
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i1 Introduction
The literature on incomplete contracts1 has given us insights into diﬃcult con-
cepts like ownership (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986) and power,2 and also provided a
bridge between diﬀerent paradigms within economics.3 The latter accomplishment
is in my opinion relatively underappreciated, and hence in this paper, I attempt
to focus on it. To be more speciﬁc, I use ideas from the incomplete contracting
literature to explore an issue (allocation of tasks and adoption of technology in an
employment relationship) that has received considerable attention in classical and
radical political economy. In this process, I also try to shed light on one dimension
of incompleteness (indescribeability) on which there is considerable debate.
While it is well known that Adam Smith extolled division of labor and specializa-
tion (e.g. in his famous discussion on the pin factory), it is not equally well known
that he was concerned about the adverse eﬀects on laborers of performing a narrow
set of tasks, and made a case for government intervention to address this.4 Adam
Ferguson, another Scottish philosopher and a contemporary of Adam Smith wrote
1For the purposes of the paper, an incomplete contract refers to any exchange in which some aspect
of a transaction is either unspeciﬁed, or if speciﬁed, not enforceable costlessly. This includes cases of
hidden information or actions (e.g. moral hazard). I discuss the various sources of incompleteness below.
2I discuss this issue in detail and provide references below.
3When incompleteness of contracts is introduced, some results derived from diﬀerent paradigms are
similar. Also, a space for conversation is created between people working within diﬀerent paradigms. For
example, the work on “contested exchange” by Bowles and Gintis (1993), although inspired by Marxian
and radical political economy, is similar in spirit to the standard principal-agent model. Also see Bowles
(1985) on diﬀerent theories of the ﬁrm, and the discussion in Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp. 256-7).
4“... His dexterity at his own particular trade, seems in this manner to be acquired at the expense
of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized society this is the
state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people must necessarily fall, unless
government takes some pains to prevent it ...” Smith 1776, Book V, p. 369.
2extensively on the negative eﬀects of division of labor and work under capitalism.5
Although not well known among economists, his work inﬂuenced modern sociology
and several thinkers, including Marx (Skinner (1979, p. 97); Hill 2007). Marx6 and
other authors working in the Marxian tradition have argued that the organization
of production under capitalism (e.g. the factory system) is concerned more with
disciplining the workforce than with eﬃciency, e.g. in an inﬂuential contribution,
Marglin (1974) argued that the putting-out and factory systems rather than being
more eﬃcient, enriched the capitalists at the expense of workers.7 Another author,
Braverman (1974) has argued that a process of routinization and deskilling of work
has occurred in the twentieth century and this process has made workers worse-oﬀ
and beneﬁted employers. Some authors have used these ideas to examine particular
industries, e.g. see Noble (1978) on machine tools.8 Denrell (2000) provides several
references to argue that these ideas percolated from Marxian theory to modern
organizational theory.
While the above literature (especially the work of classical writers) is rather rich
and prone to multiple interpretations, the purpose of this paper is more modest.
It intends to take two of its claims seriously: (a) Employment contracts may be
5“Many mechanical arts require no capacity; they succeed best under a total suppression of sentiment
and reason ... manufactures prosper most where the mind is least consulted, and where the workshop
may ... be considered as an engine, the parts of which are men...” Ferguson (1767) cited from Hill (2007).
6I have in mind both the idea from historical materialism that the institutional structure (“relations
of production”) constrains productive potential/technology (“forces of production”) and the possibility
of technical change being biased, e.g. see the discussion in Marx (1867 [1977], Chapter 15) on “Machinery
and Large-Scale Industry,” especially section 3.
7“...Rather than providing more outputs for the same inputs, these innovations in work organization
were introduced so that the capitalist got himself a larger share of the pie at the expense of the worker
...” Marglin 1974.
8Also see other articles in this particular issue of the journal Politics and Society.
3unable to optimally resolve the conﬂict of interest between laborers and employers;
(b) the adoption by employers of tasks, technology, and practices in general, is
dictated by their desire to exercise power and control over the production process
and laborers. A natural question that arises in this context is that since employers
are basically interested in maximizing their proﬁts, what necessitates them to adopt
such practices. Moreover, how do we rigorously formalize the idea that employers
exercise power or control? This paper tries to explore these questions using the
language of modern microeconomics. It asks the following questions: if we want to
take the above claims seriously, in light of modern microeconomics, how do we do
so?; What are the conditions under which these claims hold? It is my contention
that within the paradigm of incomplete contracting, these claims can be explored in
a meaningful manner. Also, some plausible conditions can be derived under which
these claims hold.
While some authors have tried to formalize the above ideas without relying
on incomplete contracting,9 the literature that is relevant for this paper, uses in-
complete contracts. For example, in a seminal paper, Bowles (1985) draws upon
the distinction made by Marx between labor (work or eﬀort) and labor power (la-
bor time) and between the spheres of exchange (the marketplace) and production
(within the ﬁrm). Since eﬀort is non-contractible, employers face the problem of
extracting it from workers, which they do by surveillance (which is costly) and by
threatening to ﬁre laborers who are caught shirking. Within the context of this
9For example, Bhadhuri (1973) formalizes Marx’s insights by exploring the adoption of technology by
a landlord-moneylender within the context of semi-feudal/less developed agriculture. The landlord leases
out land and lends to a poor sharecropper-borrower. Bhadhuri shows how the landlord-moneylender has
an incentive to adopt inferior technologies and keep the tenant indebted to him. Roemer (1983) shows
that it is optimal for proﬁt-maximizing employers to discriminate, i.e. adopt divide-and-rule practices
towards laborers. For other related references, see Bowles (1985).
4model, Bowles shows how proﬁt maximizing employers can adopt ineﬃcient tech-
nologies or divide-and-rule strategies. In this class of labor-discipline or eﬃciency
wage models, the employer’s power over the laborer stems from the result that the
employer can credibly threaten to ﬁre the laborer, whereas a similar threat by the
laborer (to leave the employer) is not credible. This is consistent with both popular
notions of power10 and with academic literature.11
Another relevant contribution is Denrell (2000) (which is based upon a model of
non-binding labor contracts by Grout (1984)), where the employer assigns tasks to
the laborer and also makes a speciﬁc non-contractible investment which increases
in the discretion that is entrusted to the laborer. This gives rise to a hold-up
problem, anticipating which the employer underinvests by assigning sub-optimal
tasks to the laborer. Denrell’s interpretation is that the employer’s choice reﬂects
his/her desire to increase his/her power or control by reducing his/her dependence
upon the laborer. Power is equated with lack of dependence, which is consistent
with the literature in sociology and radical organizational theory. Within debates
in economics too, speciﬁcity and dependence have played an important role. For
example, in an inﬂuential contribution, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) have argued
that a ﬁrm’s power is no diﬀerent from what prevails in market transactions, e.g.
10See e.g. Francois Truﬀaut’s murder mystery Finally Sunday, where one of the characters remarks:
“It’s really unfair. If a boss can ﬁre me, why can’t I ﬁre him?”
11For a survey of the relevant literature, see Bowles (2004, pp. 338-349), who argues that a suﬃcient
condition for the exercise of power is that: “For B to have power over A it is suﬃcient that by imposing
or threatening to impose sanctions on A, B is capable of aﬀecting A’s actions in ways that advance B’s
interests, while A lacks this capacity with respect to B” (p. 345). This condition is satisﬁed in the
context of eﬃciency wage models. This issue has to be seen in light of Samuelson’s (1957) remark that
in a Walrasian (or Arrow-Debreu) world, there is no qualitative distinction between capital and labor -
each can hire and ﬁre the other
5the relationship between a grocer and its employee is no diﬀerent from that between
the grocer and its customer. Hart’s (1995, pp. 57-58) response that this is not the
case hinges on the idea that the employer can deprive the employee of the assets
that he/she needs. In this sense, the employee depends upon the employer. As this
debate illustrates, both these notions of power are not entirely unrelated to each
other - the employee who has made a speciﬁc investment cannot credibly threaten to
leave his/her employer, whereas the employer can credibly threaten to ﬁre him/her.
Although related to the above studies (especially to Denrell (2000)), this paper
departs from them in some key respects. First, I focus on one source of incom-
pleteness that has not been explored in the above literature.12 This concerns “un-
foreseen” or “indescribable” contingencies wherein economic agents are unable to
foresee or physically describe future contingencies that are relevant to them. Apart
from being the more realistic assumption in at least some contexts,13 I believe that
the introduction of unforeseen contingencies, leads to interesting implications. Sec-
ond, I draw on the strand of literature that explores the resolution of conﬂicts of
interest in the presence of incomplete contracts. In particular, Aghion and Bolton
(1992) analyze ﬁnancial contracts between a venture capitalist who cares only for
the monetary return on a project and an entrepreneur who cares about not only
the monetary return, but also other attributes (e.g. being his/her own boss etc.).
The entrepreneur’s costs and beneﬁts are aﬀected by future events - the contract
cannot be based upon these events, but on a signal correlated with them. Overall,
12Some reasons for incompleteness that have been highlighted in the literature (Bowles (2004, p. 236);
Maskin 2002) are: (i) Information is not available to all parties, so that it can be veriﬁed by a third party,
(ii) Absence of a third party, (iii) It is impossible to specify all contingencies, (iv) It is too expensive to
specify all contingencies, (iv) It is in the interest of party(ies) to oﬀer incomplete contracts
13See Anderlini and Felli (1994), which argues that indescribability is linked to the algorithmic nature
of contracts and the need for making formal arguments.
6as I describe in detail below, the modeling framework used and results obtained in
this paper diﬀer from those in previous studies.
Before presenting the technical details of the model developed in this paper, it
is worthwhile to summarize the basic setup and results. There is an employer and
a laborer. The employer has a project and faces a choice over the processes that
he/she can adopt. A process speciﬁes the set of tasks that the laborer has to perform
and the technology, i.e. the returns from the project for performing these tasks.
Processes vary in sophistication and if an employer adopts a process, he/she needs
to make a speciﬁc non-contractible investment. The more sophisticated a process,
the higher is this investment. Consider an example: a ﬁrm needs to hire a worker
to record its inventory. A low sophistication process could involve hiring a literate
person and asking him/her to use pen and paper, whereas a high sophistication
process could involve the worker using a computer based inventory management
system after receiving adequate training. While the employer cares only about
his/her monetary share of the returns from the project, the laborer cares both
about his/her share and the process (i.e. the tasks that are assigned to him/her).
The laborer may not want to do dull/mundane tasks, or may prefer discretion,
or may not want too much responsibility, or may like the training/learning etc.
The laborer and employer are interacting in a complex world - neither of them can
correctly foresee (or describe) the true state of the world in the future, however
both of them have access to an imperfect signal that they can use. Once they
learn about the true nature of the world, there can be renegotiation by reassigning
processes/tasks and respecifying the shares of the surplus of the employer and the
laborer. Given this, there is a trade-oﬀ - on the one hand, there is scope for
Pareto-improvement once the true nature of the world is known, but on the other
hand, since the employer makes a speciﬁc investment, he/she will lose this if the
7laborer walks away during renegotiation, and this will lead him/her to underinvest
by assigning a less sophisticated/sub-optimal process (akin to the standard hold-
up problem). If the reassignment of processes is costly (as is realistic to assume)
and there is path dependence (the speciﬁc form of path dependence is clariﬁed
below), then the allocation is not ﬁrst-best or even constrained ﬁrst-best (which is
deﬁned as ﬁrst best among allocations which use the imperfect signal in a world
with unforeseen contingencies). The extent of the ineﬃciency, i.e diﬀerence from
the ﬁrst-best can be linked to the degree of incompleteness.
The analysis formalizes the idea from the above-mentioned literature that the
organization of production can be suboptimal given incomplete contracts and con-
ﬂicts of interest in the employment relationship. Although the paper relies on the
hold-up problem and the interpretation of power as dependence, there are some
key diﬀerences from previous studies. These are elaborated in section 3, but it is
worthwhile to summarize these here. First, the modeling framework and therefore
the results are diﬀerent. To reiterate, I focus on a source of incompleteness (viz.,
indescribeability) that has not been explored earlier, and thereby obtain new re-
sults - I am able to highlight the role of path dependence and link the degree of
incompleteness to the extent of ineﬃciency. Second, certain mechanisms that can
be used to address the hold-up problem in standard models will not work here. e.g.
if parties are prevented from renegotiating then there is no hold-up problem, but
there is also no scope for Pareto improvements, so we do not obtain ﬁrst-best (as
would be the case in a standard model) or constrained ﬁrst-best.
The literature on indescribable contingencies (e.g. Hart and Moore 1999; Maskin
2002) has been quite contested, with several relevance and irrelevance results. Given
that this literature is fairly abstract, the analysis in the paper can be seen as pro-
viding a concrete example where indescribable contingencies do and do not matter.
8The remaining part of the paper is organized into two sections. Section 2
presents the model and the analysis. Section 3 discusses the results and concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
There is a risk neutral employer who has access to a project for which he/she
needs a laborer. The employer can choose from a continuum of processes, P =
[P,P]w h e r eP and P denote processes that are least and most sophisticated,
respectively. A process P ∈Pis associated with a triple: (y(P;θ),t(P),i(P)) with
y(P;θ) denoting the returns from P. θ is a stochastic variable that represents the
true nature of the world. One can interpret it as the “ﬁt” among the process, the
laborer and the employer, which can be excellent, good, bad etc. y is continuous
and diﬀerentiable and is increasing, but at a decreasing rate in the sophistication
of the process assigned. Also, the better the ﬁt, the higher is the output and the












The ﬁt cannot be foreseen or described at the outset by the employer or the laborer.
Both of them are aware of this fact, and have access to an imperfect signal (s) that
they can use. Once (and only after) a process is assigned and some time elapses,
the true nature of the ﬁt will be known. The idea here is that in a complex world,
both the employer and the laborer can only discover the ﬁt by initially working
together. Let θ ∈ A and has a cumulative distribution function Fθ, whereas s ∈ A
and has a cumulative distribution function Fs.T h ed i ﬀ e r e n c eb e t w e e nθ and s can
be thought of as a measure of the incompleteness of contracts since only s (and
9not θ) can be incorporated into contracts. Alternatively, it can also be thought
of as a measure of complexity of the real world.14 I conceptualize the degree of








H(x) is a function of either s or θ (i.e. x = s or θ) and could for example be the
output, cost or marginal cost. Note that D measures the extent to which the world
diﬀers from using the signal s instead of using the true ﬁt θ. The sequence of events
is described in ﬁgure 1. At date 1
2, once the true distribution of θ is revealed, there
is a possibility for renegotiation. This issue will be discussed in detail below.
t(P) denotes the set of tasks assigned to the laborer. To focus on the main
issues, I abstract away from considerations of moral hazard and assume that the
laborer’s work (i.e. tasks) can be monitored at no cost. i(P) denotes the investment
that the employer has to make, which could represent for example costs incurred in
training the laborer, or setting up infrastructure. I assume that i(P) is continuous
and diﬀerentiable. The more sophisticated the process, the higher is the investment,
which is consistent with the interpretation that more sophisticated processes involve
allocating more skilled tasks or more discretion (and hence more/better training or
better infrastructure) to the laborer. I assume increasing marginal investment and





∂P2 > 0,i(P) = 0 (3)
Let w denote the wage that the employer pays to the laborer. The proﬁt of the
14Aghion and Bolton (1993) use a similar idea, although they analyze the conﬂict of interest between a
wealthy investor and an entrepreneur. The former cares only about pecuniary returns from the project,
whereas the latter cares about both pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns.
10employer from choosing process P is therefore:
π(P)=y(P;θ) − i(P) − w (4)
To abstract away from considerations of risk-sharing and focus on the main issues,
I assume that the laborer is also risk neutral. I also assume that the laborer is
wealth-constrained so that he/she cannot buy the project from the employer. The
reservation utility of the laborer is given by u. The laborer cares about his/her
wage and the process that is assigned to him/her. If the employer pays a wage w
and chooses process P, the laborer’s utility is given by:
u = w + g(P) (5)
g represents the satisfaction that the laborer gets from process P.W h i l e i t i s
not essential for the results, for ease of exposition, I assume that the laborer likes
discretion and therefore his/her utility increases in the sophistication of the process










∂P2 < 0 (6)
At date 1
2, when the true nature of θ is revealed, parties realize the extent to
which the signal they used departs from the true value, or in other words, the degree
of incompleteness of the contract. This gives rise to the possibility of renegotiation
over wages and the process assigned. For simplicity, and as is standard in the
literature, we assume that the investment is speciﬁc, i.e. if the laborer leaves after
the investment is made, the employer loses it. This assumption is not crucial - as
long as some degree of speciﬁcity exists, we can show that the results go through.
If the laborer stays, but if the process is reassigned, say from P1 to P2,t h e nt h e r e
is some cost of/loss from doing so. If P2 is more sophisticated than P1 then the
additional investment needed for the reassignment is (i(P2)−i(P1)+c(P1,P 2)). If P2
11is less sophisticated than P1 then c(P1,P 2) represents the part of the investment that
cannot be recovered. I assume that the cost function is well behaved, continuous
and diﬀerentiable. As is natural in this context, I also assume that if there is no
reassignment of processes, then no cost is incurred, otherwise, there is a positive
cost. This is summarized below:
(C1) C is continuous, diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the following property:
c(P1,P 2)=0 ,P 1 = P2;P1,P 2 ∈P (7)
> 0 otherwise (8)
(C1) implies that the cost function cannot depend solely on either the initial (P1)
or the ﬁnal (P2)p r o c e s s . 15 Hence, the ﬁrst derivatives of c(.,.) cannot vanish
everywhere. As we see below, this implication will be useful. I will also assume
that the ﬁrst derivatives of the cost function are continuous and diﬀerentiable:




∂P2 are continuous and diﬀerentiable.












(C3) (like (C1)) places restrictions on the functional form for c(.,.) with certain
forms being disallowed, e.g. linear functions of P1 or P2 like (3P1 +2 P2), which
have zero second derivatives everywhere; seperable functions like (ln(P1)+P2
2),
which have zero cross-derivatives everywhere. As we will see below, this assumption
is made for technical reasons and guarantees some properties, including regular
optima. More importantly, (C1)-(C3), which I believe are reasonable, imply that
15This can be shown in the following manner:
Proof. Consider ∃P1,P 2 ∈P ,P 1 ￿= P2. From (C1), c(P1,P 1) = 0 and c(P1,P 2) > 0. Since c(P1,P 1) ￿=
c(P1,P 2), c does not depend solely upon P1. The case of c(.;.) depending solely upon P2 is similar.
12the costs and marginal costs are not independent of the initial and ﬁnal processes.
In economic terms, this can be interpreted as a form of “path dependence” - in
two situations characterized by the same initial (ﬁnal) process, costs and marginal
costs can be diﬀerent if the ﬁnal (initial) process is diﬀerent. Essentially, the path
of reassignment matters for both costs and marginal costs.
∂c(P1,P2)
∂P1∂P2 < 0 can be
interpreted as decreasing marginal cost of reassignment, i.e. the marginal cost of
reassigning the process decreases in the initial process.
Finally, I assume that initially all the bargaining power is held by the employer,
i.e. he/she can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the laborer. If there is renegotia-
tion, there are several assumptions that can be made regarding how the surplus can
be split. I assume that the employer and the laborer get shares of α and (1 − α),
respectively where 0 <α<1. As I will show below, this particular way of dividing
the surplus is not essential for the results. Finally, it is worthwhile to point out here
that in the standard hold-up problem, renegotiation serves to redistribute, but is
not Pareto-improving. However, here, there is a potential for Pareto-improvement,
as I will discuss below.
2.2 Analysis
I will ﬁrst solve for the equilibrium allocation by using backward induction. At
date 1
2,l e tθ∗ denote the true value of θ and P1 the process that was assigned at date
0. At date 1
2 when there is renegotiation, let P2 and w denote the (new) process
assigned and the wage, respectively. The surplus of the employer is (y(P2;θ∗) −
i(P2) − c(P1,P 2) − w − (−i(P1))). Note that since the process assigned at date 0
is P1, the employer has a speciﬁc investment of i(P1) at date 1
2, which will be lost
if the laborer walks away. In other words, if the laborer walks away, the employer
has a proﬁt of (−i(P1)). The laborer’s surplus is (w+g(P2)−u). The total surplus
13is therefore:
S =[ y(P2;θ∗) − i(P2) − c(P1,P 2)+i(P1)+g(P2) − u] (9)
During renegotiation, this surplus is maximized by choosing P2 ∈Ptaking P1 as













Note that the assumptions on y,i,u and c guarantee that the second order condition
for a regular maximum is satisﬁed. Let the solution to the above equation be
denoted as P∗
2(P1;θ∗). In the analysis below, to make the notation compact, I
will suppress the arguments and use P∗









































































∂θ∗ > 0 follows from
∂2y(P∗
2 ,θ∗)
∂P2∂θ∗ > 0 and the second order condition.
Let the optimal surplus from the above problem be denoted S∗.T h i si sd e r i v e d
by substituting for P∗








14At date 0, the objective of the employer is to choose P1 and w to maximize his/her
expected proﬁt, taking into account both the possibility of renegotiation and the
participation constraint of the laborer. Note that since the employer does not know







w + g(P1) ≥ u (15)
w ≥ 0;P1 ∈P (16)
Let the solution to this problem be (￿ P1,w∗). Using (10) and (13), the ﬁrst order














) = 0 (17)
The above expression has an interesting interpretation. The process chosen
at date 0 aﬀects the ﬁnal allocation through two channels: costs of reassignment
and the outside option that the employer has during renegotiation, which in turn
depends upon the speciﬁc investment made at date 0. The more sophisticated the
process assigned at date 0, the higher is the speciﬁc investment, and the lower is
the outside option, and therefore the proﬁt during renegotiation. Essentially, there
is an incentive for the employer to assign a less sophisticated process at date 0
anticipating the hold-up problem. However, assigning a less sophisticated process
at date 0 could result in higher costs of reassignment at date 1
2. Note the importance
of the assumption of “path dependence” here. If
∂2c(P1,P2)
∂P1∂P2 = 0, then from (10),
we can see that the optimal process at date 1
2 does not depend upon the process
assigned at date 0. In this case, the employer will assign the least sophisticated
process at date 0, which involves no investment, and there is no hold-up problem.
15The overall solution is given by (10) and (17). I will call this the “Equilibrium
with Unforeseen Contingencies” and compare it with two diﬀerent kinds of opti-
mal allocations - “ﬁrst-best” and “constrained ﬁrst best”. The former is the best
among all allocations, including those with no unforeseen contingencies, i.e. if the
true distribution of θ is known. The latter is the best among all allocations with
unforeseen contingencies, i.e. where the true distribution of θ is unknown, and the
signal (s)i su s e d .
I will ﬁrst characterize the ﬁrst-best allocation. This can be done in a manner
similar to the above. In fact, the problem at date 1
2 is the same and therefore











2) − u] (18)
Note that P∗
2 is as deﬁned earlier, from equation (10). Diﬀerentiating the above















> 0) , the second order condition for a regular maximum
is satisﬁed. The optimal solution is given by (10) and (19). Let the process assigned
at date 0 be denoted P1.
I will now characterize the constrained ﬁrst best allocation, which is the best
among allocations with unforeseen contingencies. This can be done in a manner
similar to the one used to characterize the ﬁrst-best allocation. The only diﬀerence
is that at date 0, the optimal process (denoted ￿ P1) is obtained by solving (18) with
s instead of θ (since the distribution of θ is unknown). The expressions analogous



















dFs(s) = 0 (21)
How does the equilibrium with unforeseen contingencies compare with the ﬁrst-
best and constrained ﬁrst-best? This is the question that I will address below.
Before going into the details, it is worthwhile to reiterate that the initial process
assigned in the equilibrium with unforeseen contingencies, ﬁrst-best and constrained




2(￿ P1,θ∗), respectively. The result below compares the
processes assigned under the equilibrium with unforeseen contingencies and con-
strained ﬁrst-best:
Lemma 2. ￿ P1 < ￿ P1 and P∗
2(￿ P1,θ∗) <P∗
2(￿ P1,θ∗)
Proof. From (17) and (21), we can see that
∂
R
A π( e P1,s)dFs(s)
∂P1 = −(1 − α)
∂i( e P1)
∂P1 < 0.
Since ￿ P1 is the optimal solution from (17), ￿ P1 < ￿ P1 ⇒ P∗
2(￿ P1,θ∗) <P ∗
2(￿ P1,θ∗)
(from Lemma 1).
Due to the hold-up problem, the date 0 investment in the equilibrium with
unforeseen contingencies is less than the same in the constrained ﬁrst-best case.
Given the decreasing marginal cost of reassignment, the process assigned at date
1
2 (which is what really matters in terms of the process assigned) is less sophisti-
cated compared to the same under constrained ﬁrst-best. I now perform a similar
comparison with the ﬁrst-best allocation. Before doing so, it is worthwhile to com-
pare (17) and (19), the ﬁrst order conditions characterizing the equilibrium with
unforeseen contingencies and the ﬁrst-best, respectively. We can see that they






∂P1 dFθ(θ) = 0), which I assume does not hold. Unlike in the case of
comparison with the constrained ﬁrst-best, here the comparison of processes as-















The process assigned under the equilibrium with unforeseen contingencies is less










) < 0 (23)
Multiplying the ﬁrst order condition from ﬁrst-best (equation (19)) by α and using


















The above expression can be written in a compact manner and interpreted better

















The above expression has an interesting interpretation. Essentially, there are
two ineﬃciencies at play, which are represented respectively by the two terms: (i)
unforeseen contingencies, which could lead the employer to assign either a less or
more sophisticated process, and (ii) the hold-up problem, which leads the employer
to assign a less sophisticated process. If both these factors work in the same direc-
tion, then the process assigned under the equilibrium with unforeseen contingencies
is less sophisticated. On the contrary, if the ﬁrst term is positive, but not large
enough, then although these factors work in the opposite direction, the second fac-
tor dominates. We can derive a suﬃciency condition based upon (i) and (ii). First,
18a suﬃcient condition is that the signal systematically “underestimates” the true ﬁt,
so that the process that is assigned initially is less sophisticated, which results in a
less sophisticated process being assigned during renegotiation. Here, both (i) and
(ii) work in the same direction. Second, the degree of incompleteness is not “large,”
so that even if the ﬁrst factor leads the employer to assign a more sophisticated
process, the second factor dominates. The lemma below presents this result.
Lemma 3. P∗
2(￿ P1,θ∗) ￿= P∗
2(P1,θ∗). A suﬃcient condition for ￿ P1 < P1 and
P∗
2(￿ P1,θ∗) <P∗
2(P1,θ∗) is either: (S1) θ dominates s stochastically at ﬁrst order,






2(￿ P1,θ∗) ￿= P∗

















which implies that (25) is satisﬁed and therefore ￿ P1 < P1 ⇒ P∗(￿ P1,θ∗) <P∗(P1,θ∗)






2)dFθ(θ) < 0, then
the result follows from above. Otherwise, if (S2) is satisﬁed, the result follows














∂P1 . Note that
∂2i(P)
∂P2 > 0.
Note that when θ dominates s stochastically, both employer and laborer “under-
estimate” the true ﬁt, and therefore underestimate the returns from the project.16
The proposition below summarizes the main implication of the above two results.
Proposition 4. The allocation under the equilibrium with unforeseen contingencies
is neither ﬁrst-best nor constrained ﬁrst-best.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
16Note that y(P;θ) is increasing in θ.
193 Discussion and Conclusions
In the above analysis, I have formalized the idea from classical and radical
political economy that given employers’ desire to control the production process,
the allocation of tasks and the adoption of technology is sub-optimal. I have relied
on incomplete contracts of a particular kind, i.e. where contingencies are unforeseen
or indescribable. The presence of these contingencies leads to the possibility of
Pareto-improving renegotiation, but also to a hold-up problem. I used two diﬀerent
notions of optimality, and showed that the allocation is inferior to all allocations
(ﬁrst-best) and all allocations where contingencies are unforeseen (constrained ﬁrst-
best). What is crucial here is that there are costs of renegotiation and “path
dependence” - the process (tasks and technology) that is initially assigned aﬀects
the costs of reassignment at the time of renegotiation.
Although I have focused upon unforeseen contingencies that aﬀect the output
(i.e. through the ﬁt), the results are applicable to other kinds of unforeseen con-
tingencies, e.g. those that aﬀect the preferences of the laborer. Suppose the utility
function of the laborer is given by: u = w + g(P;θ)w h e r eθ is a parameter that
inﬂuences the satisfaction of the laborer from a particular process, and whose distri-
bution is unknown. The analysis can then be performed in a manner similar to the
above, and it can be shown that under certain conditions, the resulting allocation
is neither ﬁrst-best nor constrained ﬁrst-best.
I have relied on the hold-up problem and the idea of power as dependence.
However, the analysis in this paper is diﬀerent from standard treatment of the hold-
up problem (e.g as in Denrell (2000)). Consider the following situation that can be
used to illustrate the standard hold-up problem: A seller can deliver to a buyer a
product, after enhancing its value by investing. If the seller invests i, he/she incurs
20a cost of c(i)( c(0) = 0,c ￿(i) > 0) and the value of the product to the buyer is v(i)
(v￿(i) > 0). The amount of investment is non-contractible. It is easy to show that
if the possibility of renegotiation exists, given the hold-up problem, the investment
is less than ﬁrst best. The present analysis is diﬀerent from this standard situation
in several ways. First, as shown above, the results obtained in the present analysis
are diﬀerent. In particular, we have the role of path-dependence and the result that
the degree of incompleteness aﬀects the extent to which the allocation is ineﬃcient.
Second, in standard treatments of the hold-up problem, renegotiation only serves
to redistribute, whereas here it can also be Pareto improving. As a result, certain
mechanisms that can solve the hold-up problem are ineﬀective here.17 For example,
in the standard case, if the employer and laborer write down a “good faith” clause
which commits them to not renegotiate, and which can be enforced by a neutral
third-party, this mechanism will solve the hold-up problem (i.e. deliver ﬁrst-best).
Since, the seller is assured that there will be no renegotiation, he/she will put in the
ﬁrst-best level of investment. Here, commitment to not renegotiate will not deliver
the ﬁrst-best or even constrained ﬁrst-best because although it solves the hold-up
problem, it also prevents the possibility of Pareto-improvements.
Another mechanism that could work in the standard case is a “default option”
- in case trade does not happen, then the seller is entitled to some (“default”)
payment that is agreed upon by the buyer and the seller and that can be enforced
by a neutral third party. This mechanism will deliver ﬁrst-best since the default
payment can be set equal to the proﬁt that the seller obtains from ﬁrst-best invest-
ment, if there is no hold-up problem (i.e. no renegotiation). The seller will put in
the ﬁrst-best investment because even if the buyer forces renegotiation, the seller
is guaranteed the default payment (which is set in the above-mentioned manner).
17For a discussion of some of these, see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), section 12.3.
21In the current model, this mechanism will not deliver ﬁrst-best or even constrained
ﬁrst-best. The reason is that ex-ante, the proﬁt from ﬁrst-best or constrained ﬁrst-
best investment is not known so that the default payment cannot be set as above.
The thrust of the above results is that when unforeseen contingencies are intro-
duced, the implications for eﬃciency are more complex compared to the standard
model. On the one hand, the allocation is ineﬃcient only if path dependence is
satisﬁed. On the other hand, when path dependence is satisﬁed, not only is the
allocation ineﬃcient, but also the ineﬃciency cannot be prevented by using mech-
anisms that work in the standard case.
Finally, it is worthwhile to look at the results in the context of the literature
on unforeseen contingencies. As mentioned in the introduction, this literature has
been somewhat contested with several relevance and irrelevance results. It has also
raised some questions that go to the foundations of what constitutes an incomplete
contract. The treatment in this literature is fairly abstract. Hence, this paper can
be seen as contributing to this literature in two ways: First, it provides an instance
where unforeseen contingencies do and do not matter in a concrete setting. Second
(and related to the above), it links this literature to older and wider debates within
economics and other social sciences.
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